NEXUS ACCESS
Market Links & Mirror Information
Market Links & Mirror Information
All Nexus links, Nexus mirrors, and the onion addresses are permanently offline. Nexus market conducted an exit scam on January 18, 2025, stealing $15 million from users. All Nexus market infrastructure was shut down simultaneously. There are NO working Nexus links or Nexus mirrors. Any sites claiming to be Nexus market are phishing scams designed to steal credentials and funds. This Nexus url page serves as historical reference only for educational purposes.
Before the January 2025 exit scam, Nexus marketplace operated multiple onion mirrors for redundancy and DDoS protection. The market maintained official verified links across several onion addresses, all sharing the same database and escrow system. Users could access the marketplace through any of these verified mirrors, with all transactions synchronized across the network. The links provided consistent access regardless of network issues or targeted attacks on specific mirrors.
All historical onion addresses listed below are permanently offline and will never return. The marketplace administrators disabled all infrastructure simultaneously during the exit scam, ensuring complete loss of access to funds and communications. These URL references are provided solely for educational and historical documentation purposes. Never attempt to access any of these links or mirrorsâthey are all offline, and any similar addresses are phishing attempts.
nexusaldu7wwewcpcn4reptcp72rsaeogolfvjncafua2oywwswwyaqd.onion
nexusbbqsh42lvde337tiruwfbikusjhdfukr2roacd4m7t7j5esvtqd.onion
nexuscr3cittluc2rcu3qsyk4hcczor5py56nstpz4g4pohtfpt3qvqd.onion
nexusd6kh4at2iof2tg2a7vmzs5vz4ocdpc5v6onski4moafsj65lcid.onion
nygbourj3b6dsx7b5cqcdaomz96fhct769absp4efvri893vc9az7vps.onion
l4k3o6ok1r08o0prdkv0h2yes51zo6awoz2bltfbn5l30hdh80ngibo7.onion
vter5j6pxd10nut0dsm5xd9ou0saeeatd97y2ssipttox3odncp3vk2n.onion
uds8dhvqyz426f83m6rug3h4cyl1fybg9j0ng4u84nb2maz06qsog8zl.onion
All addresses above are permanently offline. Nexus Market conducted an exit scam on January 18, 2025. Any site claiming to be Nexus is a phishing scam. Never attempt to access these addresses or provide credentials to lookalike sites.
System Status: Last sync Dec 16, 2025 10:00 UTC
Following the marketplace exit scam, numerous phishing sites have emerged claiming to be "the new market" or "backup mirrors." These are scams designed to steal your cryptocurrency, credentials, and PGP keys. There are NO legitimate links, NO working mirrors, and NO onion addresses still operational.
Scammers create phishing sites that closely mimic the original marketplace interface using the distinctive cyberpunk design. These fake links attempt to steal funds by:
During market operation, users verified authentic links through several methods. The marketplace published official PGP-signed lists of verified mirrors on trusted darknet forums like Dread. Each official onion address was cryptographically signed with the marketplace's PGP public key using GnuPG, allowing users to verify authenticity before accessing. This URL verification system was considered reliable during operation, though it could not prevent the coordinated exit scam from administrators with control over all links and infrastructure.
Users downloaded the official marketplace PGP public key from trusted sources. This key was used to verify all official communications about links and mirrors.
Market administrators posted PGP-signed messages containing verified onion addresses. Users verified signatures to ensure URL authenticity before accessing.
Dread darknet forum maintained updated lists of working mirrors. Community verified which links were currently accessible and which were experiencing issues.
Users only accessed the marketplace through verified onion addresses, never through clearnet proxies or unverified URL links that could be phishing attempts.
Despite these verification measures, the market exit scam demonstrated that verification systems are meaningless when platform administrators themselves are malicious actors. All links and mirrors were controlled by administrators who disabled everything simultaneously, preventing any user recourse or fund recovery.
Following the marketplace exit scam, users should understand that ALL centralized darknet markets carry the same fundamental risk. No amount of market-level security features can prevent administrators with full control from conducting exit scams. Consider these lessons when evaluating alternatives:
Even when the market was operational, phishing remained one of the most dangerous threats to users. Malicious actors created fake links and fraudulent mirrors that perfectly replicated the official platform's cyberpunk interface and functionality. These phishing sites captured user credentials, PGP private keys, and cryptocurrency deposits, stealing millions from users who believed they were accessing legitimate onion addresses. Now that the marketplace is offline, ALL sites claiming to be this market are guaranteed phishing scams.
Sophisticated phishing operations targeting marketplace users employed multiple techniques: cloned websites with nearly-identical onion addresses (changing just one character), SEO poisoning to rank fake links highly in search results, and compromised forum accounts posting fraudulent mirrors. Some phishing sites even implemented functional escrow systems to build trust before eventually stealing all deposited funds. The professional presentation of the market made these attacks particularly effectiveâusers expected cyberpunk-styled interfaces and assumed any site matching that aesthetic was legitimate.
The only reliable method for verifying authentic market links involved PGP signature verification using tools like Gpg4win on Windows or GPG Suite on macOS. The official marketplace administrators maintained a PGP public key posted on trusted forums and clearnet mirror sites. All authentic onion addresses came with PGP-signed messages proving they originated from operators controlling that key. Users who verified PGP signatures before accessing mirrors could definitively confirm link authenticityâfake sites could replicate the interface but couldn't forge cryptographic signatures.
However, proper PGP verification required understanding beyond basic usage. Users needed to verify not just that signatures validated, but that they validated against the CORRECT public key. Phishing operations sometimes posted their own PGP keys alongside fake links, with signatures that validated perfectlyâagainst the wrong key. Sophisticated users maintained local copies of the official market PGP key obtained from multiple independent trusted sources, never downloading keys from unfamiliar locations or accepting key updates without extensive verification.
The onion addresses used Tor's v3 onion formatâ56-character addresses ending in .onion. The length and complexity of these addresses provided some security, as typosquatting attacks that changed just one character were harder to execute with 56-character strings. However, users who bookmarked or memorized their URLs remained vulnerable to DNS hijacking, clipboard malware that replaced copied addresses, or simple typos when manually entering addresses. Security-focused users often used Whonix or Tails OS to minimize these risks.
Best practice for accessing the market involved maintaining locally-stored text files with verified onion addresses, never relying on internet searches or links posted in untrusted forums. Some security-conscious users went further, implementing checksum verification processes where they calculated cryptographic hashes of their stored address files and regularly verified them against known-good values. This prevented clipboard malware or file-corruption attacks from redirecting them to phishing sites. After the marketplace exit scam, all stored addresses became obsoleteâbut the verification principles remain applicable to other platforms.
Following the January 2025 market exit scam, phishing operations intensified dramatically. Scammers created fake "recovery" sites claiming the platform would return, solicited "verification deposits" to "prove account ownership," or offered "partial fund recovery" services requiring upfront cryptocurrency payments. These scams exploited desperate users hoping to recover stolen funds from the legitimate exit scam. No recovery is possibleâadministrators who stole $15 million have no intention of returning it, and any site claiming otherwise is an additional scam.
Current phishing threats targeting former marketplace users include fake alternative markets with similar branding, fraudulent "official migration" announcements directing users to new platforms, and impersonators posing as staff on forums. The cyberpunk aesthetic continues appearing on scam sites attempting to capitalize on the platform's former reputation. Users searching for mirrors or official links remain vulnerable to SEO-optimized phishing sites ranking highly in search results. This page serves educational purposesâthere are NO legitimate market operations remaining.
During operation, the marketplace maintained multiple onion mirrors distributed across Tor network. This architecture provided redundancy and DDoS protectionâif one link experienced attacks or technical issues, users could access alternative mirrors sharing the same backend infrastructure. All mirrors synchronized to a single database, meaning transactions, messages, and account data remained consistent regardless of which URL users accessed. This design pattern is common among professional darknet marketplaces, balancing availability with operational complexity.
The marketplace mirror architecture likely employed load balancing across multiple servers, possibly using Tor's onion service v3 protocol features for basic traffic distribution. Each onion address resolved to separate hidden service directories, but backend application servers likely shared database clusters and file storage systems. This centralizationâwhile improving user experienceâcreated single points of failure that ultimately enabled the exit scam. When administrators decided to steal funds, they controlled all infrastructure simultaneously, making selective recovery impossible.
DDoS protection represented a critical function of the multi-mirror strategy. Darknet marketplaces frequently experience denial-of-service attacks from competing platforms, law enforcement, or extortionists demanding cryptocurrency payments. By distributing addresses across multiple onion services, administrators could continue operating even when individual mirrors faced attacks. However, this protection applied only to network-level attacksâthe platform's centralized architecture couldn't defend against the insider threat of malicious administrators.
Geographic distribution and hosting diversity likely characterized the mirror infrastructure. Operating hidden services from multiple countries complicated law enforcement seizures and provided resilience against local network issues or hosting provider problems. However, the January 2025 exit scam demonstrated that hosting diversity meant nothing when administrators themselves were the threat. All links, mirrors, and URL endpoints disappeared simultaneously because the same operators controlled the entire distributed infrastructure.
Future darknet marketplace architectures may eliminate the need for centralized mirror-style infrastructures entirely. Distributed hash tables (DHTs), blockchain-based naming systems like Namecoin, or decentralized identity protocols could enable trustless marketplace discovery where users find vendor nodes through cryptographic proofs rather than centrally-controlled onion addresses. Technologies like IPFS and Bitcoin-based smart contracts offer potential solutions. These systems would make exit scams structurally impossible by removing administrator control over infrastructure.
The marketplace's centralized mirror architecture, while user-friendly, represented the fundamental vulnerability that enabled the exit scam. Decentralized alternatives sacrifice convenience for securityâpeer-to-peer systems lack the polished user experience but eliminate single points of failure. As darknet ecosystem evolves beyond centralized platforms, architectural decentralization may become the expected standard rather than experimental alternative.
During market operation, clearnet websites provided mirror lists and status updatesâbut these sites represented massive security risks. Any clearnet resource could be compromised by law enforcement or phishing operators, making them unreliable sources for link verification. Users who relied on clearnet mirror lists without independent PGP verification frequently accessed phishing sites. The official marketplace policy recommended against trusting any clearnet resources without cryptographic proof of authenticity.
This info page itself serves educational purposes, providing historical information about the platform's operation and ultimate exit scam. However, we emphasize again: ALL onion addresses are permanently offline. Any clearnet or darknet resource claiming to provide working mirrors or official links is operating a phishing scam. The only legitimate market information serves retrospective educational purposes, not active access facilitation.